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Abstract 
Studies that investigate the effect of the regional ethnic composition on immigrant outcomes 
have been complicated by the self-selection of ethnic minorities into specific neighbourhoods. 
We analyse the impact of own-ethnic concentration on the language proficiency of 
immigrants by exploiting the fact that the initial placement of guest-workers after WWII was 
determined by labour demanding firms and the federal labour administration and hence 
exogenous to immigrant workers. Combining several data sets, we find a small but robust and 
significant negative effect of ethnic concentration on immigrants’ language ability. Simulation 
results of a choice model in which location and learning decisions are taken simultaneously 
confirm the presence of the effect. Immigrants with high learning costs are inclined to move 
to ethnic enclaves, so that the share of German-speakers would increase only modestly even 
under the counterfactual scenario of a regionally equal distribution of immigrants across 
Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
Immigration and the social and economic performance of immigrants have been 
controversial policy issues for decades, both in North America and Europe. From the immigrants’ 
perspective, leaving behind a familiar social context and adapting to a new environment can be 
challenging; however, the experience can be exacerbated if immigrants do not succeed in 
integrating into the host country’s society, a state often associated with the failure to learn the 
majority language. The existence of segregated “parallel” societies which are said to be 
characterised by poverty risk and unemployment, has fueled the debate on the integration of 
immigrants in Germany. The political concern is that certain immigrant groups might form self-
sufficient enclaves and challenge the life-style as well as formal or informal institutions of 
German society. While those fears may be exaggerated and largely related to the until recently 
maintained official denial of Germany being a country of immigration
2
, their existence and 
impact on the immigration debate is a potential cause for mutual resentment.  
The scope of this paper is to analyse the effect of regional ethnic concentration on 
language proficiency of first-generation immigrants in Germany. By exploiting the fact that the 
post WWII guest-worker immigration was a quasi-natural experiment through the exogenous 
placement of immigrants in firms across West Germany, we estimate the causal effect of own-
ethnicity concentration on a basic type of human capital, namely German speaking and writing 
proficiency. By merging several representative data sets and addressing potential endogeneity 
bias with an IV approach we provide robust evidence of a small negative effect from ethnic 
concentration on language fluency. Although similar questions have been addressed for more 
traditional immigration countries like the USA, Australia and Canada, no research exists on this 
question for Germany so far.
3
 The paper focuses on the language skills of immigrants for the 
following reasons: 
Language skills are a crucial part of the human capital endowment of an immigrant and the 
earnings implications are well documented (see below). By looking at language as an 
                                                 
2
 “Germany is not an immigration country.” was the leading principle for immigration and “foreigner”-policies in the 
coalition contract between conservatives and liberal democrats in 1982 (Herbert, 2001, pp. 247-248). See also the 
essay “Integration ist machbar” by Bade in the daily newspaper Die Welt (2009).  
3
 Sociological research has dealt with the neighbourhood quality of ethnic clusters in Germany (Drever, 2004). 
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endogenous variable we dissect one of the proximate determinants of labour market 
outcomes. 
If the costs of learning German are of a non-monetary nature (e.g., effort) while benefits are 
largely reflected in wages, the assumption of a monotonic and continuous dependency of 
wages on ethnic concentrations might give rise to misspecifications, as will be shown in 
the next section. 
The benefits of having a good command of German extend to many areas outside the labour 
market (e.g., participation in the civil society or use of health care) and have been used 
to measure successful integration of immigrants.  
The economic consequences of language command have been studied intensively and 
for many countries (see for example Chiswick and Miller (2002) and (2005) and Bleakley and 
Chin (2004) for the USA, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for the UK, Dustmann (1994) and 
Dustmann and van Soest (2001) and (2002) for Germany, and Chiswick and Miller (1995) for 
Australia). Comparing the “fluency penalty” across the cited articles is complicated by 
differences in immigration histories (e.g., rates of return migration), and by differences in 
methodologies including the survey instrument to investigate self-assessed language proficiency 
(e.g., the U.S. and Australian censuses distinguish between four levels of English proficiency, 
whereas the German GSOEP data have five levels); however, the entire literature confirms that 
immigrants with good speaking and writing abilities perform better in the labour market in terms 
of earnings and employment compared to immigrants who speak and write poorly.  
Another strand of the immigration literature has focused on the influence of ethnic 
enclaves on economic performance and/or language fluency. Theoretical arguments for the 
influence of ethnic capital and its transmission through neighbourhoods on immigrants’ 
performance have been made by Borjas (1995) and (1998). Most studies that we are aware of find 
a negative association between ethnic concentration and language proficiency (Cutler et al. 
(2008), Chiswick and Miller (2005), Lazear (1999) for the USA, Warman (2007) for Canada, and 
Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for the UK, and Chiswick and Miller (1996) for Australia). Only the 
paper by Cutler et al. (2008) attempts to correct for the potential self-selection of immigrants into 
specific neighbourhoods (ghettos) by using an occupational instrument matrix. For Germany, no 
study analyses the link between ethnic concentration and language proficiency. The cited papers 
vary substantially in the size of the regions for which ethnic concentrations are defined, but the 
  
4 
negative effect is consistently stronger when the regions are defined on less aggregated levels. If 
immigrants who are less willing or able to learn a language cluster in local neighbourhoods and 
counties this finding is not surprising.  
Stronger identification attempts have been made when looking at earnings of 
immigrants and how they are affected by ethnic concentration. Damm (2009) and Edin et al. 
(2003) use exogenous placement policies for immigrants in Denmark and Sweden. Initial 
placement of arriving immigrants is exploited to instrument for current exposure to their own 
ethnic group. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) use instruments pertaining to the administration and 
topography of the regions, such as the number of local governments and rivers in a metropolitan 
statistical unit. The results with respect to earnings are not as unambiguous as for language 
fluency. Edin et al. find that living in enclaves improves earnings of less skilled immigrants while 
no significant effect pertains for immigrants with more than 10 years of education. Damm finds 
that higher ethnic concentrations increase earnings irrespective of skill levels, Warman finds 
negative effects of enclaves on income growth and Cutler and Glaeser find negative effects of 
segregation for African-Americans.    
This paper combines the latter two strands of literature by using an initially exogenous 
placement policy in order to instrument the effect of regional ethnic composition on language 
ability. Apart from being the first study of its kind for Germany, our paper adds to the literature a 
learning and location choice model which yields testable implications for the link between ethnic 
concentration and language proficiency, and which is able to explain why studies on the effect of 
enclaves on earnings remain contradictory. Furthermore, the model allows simulating 
counterfactual outcomes for changes in regional ethnic concentration or average immigrant 
characteristics. This exercise is informative for gauging the impact of potential future 
immigration when Germany fully opens her labour market for the Central and Eastern European 
countries of the EU in 2011.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we set up our simple learning 
and location choice model. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the guest-worker programme in 
Germany and underlines specific characteristics that resulted in exogenous placement of 
immigrants across German regions. Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the identification 
strategy used throughout the paper, a description of data sources as well as a discussion of the 
choice of the regional aggregation level. Section 5 provides the results from the econometric 
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analyses. Section 6 discusses potential explanations for the difference in OLS and IV estimates as 
well as the potential bias from measurement error. Section 7 contains some brief policy 
simulations based on our structural model, while Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Theory 
In this section, we turn to the random utility model which derives location and learning 
choice probabilities through utility maximizing behavior. Suppose learning German is costly, and 
the cost of immigrant i can be described by some observable characteristics
iX , a vector of 
parameters β , and an unobservable component ε, such as ability, which is assumed to be 
continuous and which we allow, but do not require, to differ across regions j. Assuming the cost 
to be linear in variables we write: 
 
j
ii
j
i Xc εβ +′=          (1) 
 
We assume that an immigrant enjoys some benefit from the number or share of people 
he can interact with. An example is the model by Lazear (1999), in which two people in a region 
are matched randomly and trade occurs with a fixed payoff if both can interact, that is, speak the 
same language. In this case the benefit would be the expected payoff before a match occurs and it 
would be linear in the share of people an agent can interact with. For the moment we just use a 
generic function )( jxξ  where jx  equals the fraction of people the immigrant can interact with in 
location j, so that jx  takes the value jfx  if the immigrant does not speak German (the subscript f 
standing for foreign) and jn
j
f xx +  if he speaks German (n standing for native). The shares of 
natives and all foreigner groups (denoted by an indexing set F) have to sum to 1: 
 
1=+∑
∈Fz
j
z
j
n xx   .0, ≥
j
z
j
n xx       (2) 
 
Different locations are then characterised by: 
1. variables differing across locations but equal for all immigrants in that 
     location, jW , 
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2. variables characterizing the ethnic concentration, jn
j
f xx ,  which differ 
    across locations and across immigrant groups (but not across immigrants of the same 
    country of origin), 
3. an unobservable, continuously distributed component j
ir . 
 
Denoting by iS  an indicator taking on the value of one, if the immigrant learns 
German, and zero otherwise, utility of choosing S and location j for a given immigrant i is thus: 
 
j
ii
j
ij
j
fii
j
f
j
nijSi SrWxSXxxSU εγξβξ −+′+−+′−+= )(*)1())((*),(,   (3) 
  
The first term describes the deterministic part (from the point of the econometrician) of 
utility from learning German. The immigrant can interact with both natives and immigrants of his 
own group, but incurs the cost βiX ′ . The second term is the utility enjoyed by interacting with 
other members of the immigrant group only. The term jij rW +′γ  describes the utility specific to 
the region for the immigrant, regardless of whether or not he learns German, and the last term is 
an unobservable part of the cost of learning German. The choice set consists of all unordered 
distinct pairs of ),( jS  and the chosen alternative is 
 
}{maxarg*)*,( ),(
},1,0{
js
Jjs
UjS
∈∈
=         (4) 
 
Equation (4) simply states that learning and location decisions are part of the same 
choice, a fact that was acknowledged but not formalised earlier by Lazear (1999) and Bauer et al. 
(2005). 
   
For notational simplicity, denote the observable part of utility by  
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γξ
γβξ
j
j
fji
ji
j
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j
nji
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)(
),0(,
),1(,
 
 
and the composite error term j
ii
j
i Sr ε−  by ),(, jSiω . Omitting the individual index, the 
probability of learning German and choosing location j is given by 
 
),,...,,,...,,(
)},1,0{(),1(
),0(),1(),0(),1()1,0()1,1(),1(
),1(),(),(),1(
JJjjj
jksksj
VVVVVV
jksVVPjSP
−−−+−−Φ=
≠∈∀−≥−== ωω
  (5) 
 
with ),1( jΦ (V) being the distribution function of ),,...,,( ),0(),1()1,0()1,1( JJ ωωωω  for 
),1( jSP =  at V. The second equality is simply saying that the probability of choosing a 
particular ),( jS  is increasing in the associated utility and decreasing in the observed utility of 
any other alternative. In order to be able to make statements about the reaction of learning 
probabilities to changes in the immigrant share within a region we need to introduce an 
assumption concerning the payoff function ξ : 
 
Assumption 1.   )(xξ  is differentiable and strictly increasing in its argument.  
 
It follows: 
 
Proposition 1.    Let the choice problem of the immigrant be described by equations (2) 
and (3). Under assumption 1, and holding constant the shares of all immigrant groups other than 
f: 
1. 0
)|1(
≤
∂
=∂
j
fx
jSP
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with strict inequalities if ),( jsω  has strictly positive density everywhere. 
 
Proof.   1. The probability of learning German conditional on location j is: 
 
    ( ) ( )),1(),0(),0(),1(),0(),1()|1( jjjjjj VVPUUPjSP ωω −>−=>==  
    Taking the derivative with respect to jfx  gives: 
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2. Taking the derivative of ),1( jSP =  with respect to jfx  gives: 
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3. The probability of moving to k is: 
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4. The unconditional probability of speaking German is: 
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with the derivative 
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Q.E.D. 
 
All of the inequalities above follow the same intuition: An increase of jfx  increases the 
observable part of utility of only one choice, which is moving to j and not learning German. In 
particular, it leaves the utility of choice (S=1,j) unchanged, since the increased immigrant share 
just replaces natives and does not change the interaction possibilities for a German-speaker. This 
effect is captured in the (-1+1) terms in the proof. Thus, all options including learning German 
are decreased in value relative to (S=0,j). Furthermore, since all choice probabilities other than 
P(S,j) are decreasing in ),( jSV , the probability of moving to any location jk ≠  is also decreasing. 
If we assume ξ  to be concave, the condition that a higher share of the own immigrant 
group f replace the respective share of natives can be relaxed. Furthermore, the results can be 
generalised to the case where jfx  and 
j
nx  stand for the absolute number of immigrants and 
natives in a region. At least in the latter case, concavity would not be an innocuous assumption if 
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there exist externalities in benefits from x for some range, such as threshold values for the supply 
of certain goods and services. 
>> Figure 1 about here << 
An interesting implication of the model arises when the costs of learning German are 
unobserved (time and effort spent learning), but benefits are to some extent reflected in higher 
earnings (see Figure 1). The earnings (solid line) of immigrants will then be increasing in the 
ethnic concentration for immigrant i  for concentrations above a certain threshold value ixx >  
with ix being the concentration of own group members at which immigrants stop to learn 
German. For all values below 
ix  the immigrant learns German and her earnings are invariant to 
],0[ ixx∈ . If ix  is smaller for less educated immigrants (they do not learn German even at low 
ethnic concentrations), empirical studies might find a positive concentration effect on earnings 
for less educated and no effect for better educated immigrants (which for example is found by 
Edin et al.), or might find inconclusive results. 
 
To compare the quantities in proposition 1, we need another assumption: 
 
Assumption 2.   The probability of learning German conditional on location j reaches 
1 as jfx  approaches zero:  
1)|1(lim
0
==
→
jSP
j
fx
 
 
Proposition 2.   Let the choice problem of the immigrant be described by equations (2) 
and (3). Under assumptions 1 and 2: 
 
j
f
j
f x
jSP
x
SP
∂
=∂
>
∂
=∂ )|1()1(
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for small jfx  (
j
fx  approaching 0).  
 
Proof.   We need to show: 
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since 0),0(lim
0
==
→
jSP
j
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 is implied by assumption 2. With 1)|1(lim
0
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which holds since 
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and 01)|1( <−= kSP . 
Since ξ  is differentiable, there is a neighbourhood around jfx  for which the inequality 
holds. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Note that the “small” jfx  condition is sufficient, and less restrictive and/or alternative 
conditions can be found. For example, the inequality will hold if the marginal utility from contact 
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with other people goes to infinity as the share of people one can interact with goes to 0, 
∞=′
→
)(lim
0
x
x
ξ , or whenever 
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The intuition of the proposition is that if the immigrant is limited to one location, he 
cannot “escape” the incentive to learn German by moving to another location. Lowering the 
immigrant share in a location where it was low initially is not going to change the learning 
decision of the immigrant, since he can choose from a multitude of locations. 
The results are fairly general and do not require any distributional assumptions other 
than continuity on the ω . In particular, no covariance structure is assumed. To illustrate the 
working of the model we provide a short example. Let the ω  be independently (across choices 
and individuals) and identically distributed type I extreme value errors, resulting in the well-
known multinomial logit model with the choice probabilities given by 
 
( )∑ +
=
k
VV
V
kk
jS
ee
e
jSP
),0(),1(
),(
),(        (6) 
 
Let ( ) ))((*)1()(*),( jfjfjnjS xSxxSV ξξ −++= , so that observable utility is given only 
by the composition of the population. Finally, let )ln()( xx =ξ . It is easy to verify that 
assumptions 1 and 2 hold under this specification. We would have: 
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It can be verified that  
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The model is highly stylised to highlight the decision problem and the tradeoffs that 
immigrants face, and naturally it has some shortcomings. First, we accept the payoff function ξ  
as a black-box mechanism. Agents benefit from increased communication prospects with other 
agents, but we do not link these benefits to any “deep” parameters or structures.
4
 A more serious 
problem might be the omission of moving costs. Here, we are mainly led by data restrictions in 
our decision not to model moving costs. The bottleneck in the empirical part is the number of 
immigrants in the German Socio-Economic Panel, with roughly 2,000 observations in 1985 and 
1,000 observations in 2001. Very few of those move across regions, as we define them, and we 
cannot know for what reasons they change their location. Our conjecture is that moving costs 
would bring the marginal probabilities of learning German conditional and unconditional on 
location closer to each other, since “escaping” a region becomes more costly. 
While the working of the model as summarised above is instructive for understanding 
the choice situation and the trade-offs each immigrant faces as well as for thinking about 
                                                 
4
 While this could be done (Lazear (1999) being a possible starting point), it would be only of secondary interest in 
answering our research question. 
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counterfactuals, the estimation strategy should depend on the hypothesis to be tested. In the 
empirical section we aim at estimating  
 
j
fx
jSP
∂
=∂ )|1(
  
 
for its intuitive interpretation (as a treatment effect). Identification will rely on our 
assumption that initial placement and location choices for a certain time period after arrival in 
Germany were exogenous to immigrants with respect to their willingness/ability to learn German.    
A more holistic estimation (allowing for simultaneous learning and location choices of 
immigrants) of responses to different ethnic concentration counterfactuals will be carried out in 
the experiments section. Naturally, the latter will require more of the structure outlined above 
(and consequently will be more restrictive), but can be carried out without the use of instruments. 
Thus, it provides a robustness check of the direct estimation of the treatment effect.    
 
3. The Guest-Worker Programme in West Germany 1955-1973 
The 1950s and 60s in Germany have become known as the time of the 
„Wirtschaftswunder“ (economic miracle), an episode of rapid post-war reconstruction and 
economic growth. The miracle has been facilitated by an inflow of refugees from East Germany 
and territories formerly belonging to the German Reich or inhabited by a German-speaking 
population. As this inflow (8.3 million until 1950) ebbed off, labour shortages became evident, 
and between 1959 and 1962 the number of vacancies overtook the number of people registered as 
unemployed. The guest-worker recruitment in Germany began with the German-Italian 
Recruitment Treaty signed in December 1955 to meet the hunger for labour of the German 
economy.
5
 Subsequent treaties were signed with Greece and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, 
Portugal in 1964, and Yugoslavia in 1968.  
>> Figure 2 about here << 
                                                 
5
 The description of the recruitment history and its technicalities draws on Herbert (2001).   
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Figure 2 shows the development of the share of the foreign population in Germany, 
where foreign is defined as not holding German citizenship. Until 1960 the presence of guest-
workers was a marginal phenomenon, but we see that recruitment gained momentum in the early 
60s and increased steadily until 1967. A dip in the share of foreign employees occurred in 1967 
as the result of a brief recession, which however did not affect the further inflow of the foreign 
population. Within 13 years, the share of foreign employees rose from less than one to twelve 
percent. Recruitment was halted in 1973 as a consequence of a more severe economic recession; 
however, the upward trend of the foreign population continued modestly due to family 
reunification.  
The composition of the foreign population has been subject to substantial changes, as 
seen in Figure 3. While Italians constituted the most numerous group of foreigners in 1969, the 
Turkish population overtook all other groups in 1971 and has been widening the gap ever since. 
Notably, the numbers of Turks never decreased after the recruitment stop, as it did for other 
guest-worker groups. 
>> Figure 3 about here << 
Technically, the recruitment was performed by a recruitment commission in the 
sending country which was jointly set up by the Federal Employment Agency of Germany and 
the Labour administration of the sending country. German firms requested workers according to 
their needs and the commission assigned workers from an application pool to specific firms. 
Workers signed one-year contracts with their first employers at decentralised labour office 
branches before arriving in Germany. Permits to live in Germany for the duration of one year 
were issued, but the permission was conditional on employment with the employer of the 
contract. Accommodation and travel costs were covered by the employer, so that monetary and 
administrative costs of the application and the move were essentially zero for the guest-worker. 
The recruitment was designed to attract workers with very low skill requirements. In Germany, 
most guest-workers became employed in manufacturing, notably in the construction, mining, 
metal and ferrous industries. As of 1966, 72% of the foreign workforce comprised unskilled 
workers.  
 
4. Identification  
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The basic question we attempt to answer in this research is whether the ethnic 
composition in their neighbourhood negatively impacts on the language fluency of immigrants. 
We use the quasi-natural experiment of the guest-worker immigration that took mainly place in 
the 1960s and 1970s in order to establish a causal link between area composition and individual 
ability to speak and write German. Guest-workers were little educated and generally without any 
knowledge of the German language upon arrival thus reducing the problem of selective 
migration.6 As guest-workers were contracted in their home countries based on the (mostly 
manual) labour demand of German firms and administered by outlets of the German Labour 
Office, migrants had no control over their placement in Germany.
7
 The idea is then to compare 
immigrants who were placed in areas with different ethnic compositions and thus with different 
incentives and costs to learn German. The natural counterfactual for a person living in a cluster 
with a high concentration of own ethnic co-residents is a person of the same ethnicity in a low-
concentration area. Comparing persons of the same ethnicity levels out the potential bias from 
linguistic distances between languages. 
The ideal set-up of our investigation would be to have a data source with objective 
measures of language speaking and writing fluency for immigrants who were randomly 
distributed over Germany without ever changing their place of residence. In this case, we could 
simply estimate the basic OLS model 
 
uysmxy +++++= µκγβα )(       (7) 
 
where y stands for language ability, x stands for ethnic concentration, (ysm) stands for 
exposure to the host country language (years since migration), κ are country of origin fixed 
effects, µ are regional fixed effects and u is a random error term. The estimated coefficient β 
would report the own-ethnic concentration effect which should carry a negative sign in case we 
                                                 
6
 In a recent study on linguistic integration of immigrants in Germany, still more than 90 percent of Turkish 
immigrants responded that they had no usable German knowledge upon arrival (Rother, 2008). 
7
 Given this procedure, the initial placement was exogenous to the guest-workers. From the perspective of family 
members moving to Germany in the framework of the family reunification, the location was also exogenous. 
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expect ethnic concentration to inhibit learning German, that is if assumption (1) in the theory 
section holds.  
 
Data 
In order to estimate the causal effect of ethnic concentration on language fluency, this 
paper combines different data sources. As we are interested in language ability of individual 
immigrants, we make use of the guest-worker sample B of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) which was started in 1984 and which provides detailed information on individual and 
household characteristics. This sample initially comprised 1,393 households with either a Greek, 
Italian, Spanish, Turkish, or Yugoslavian household head. Due to the limited sample size of the 
GSOEP we have to use administrative data in order to generate regional concentration measures 
of guest-workers. Unfortunately, the 1984 wave of the GSOEP does not allow sufficiently 
detailed regional merging with other data sources: instead we use the 1985 wave comprising 
2,346 immigrants with full information from the five most important guest-worker countries. 
The main outcome of interest is language knowledge. As mentioned before, we would 
be interested in using objective language measures, which are to date, however, unavailable in 
Germany.
8
 As a consequence we are left with indicators of self-assessed language fluency and 
writing ability which are measured on a five-category ordinal Likert-scale ranging from “not 
speaking at all” (lowest category) to “speaking very well” (highest category). For most of the 
analysis, we use a binary variable for speaking and writing ability which takes on the value one 
for the two highest scores on the Likert scale and zero otherwise. As can be seen from Table 1, 
less than half of the sample claimed to speak or write German at least at a good level in 1985.  
>> Table 1 about here << 
Demographic information comprises gender, marital status, country of origin, age at 
migration, years since migration, years of schooling, a dummy variable for education abroad and 
a dummy indicating the presence of children in the household. Table 1 further reveals that the 
average immigrant entered Germany at relatively young age (23 years) and had spent almost 15 
                                                 
8
 The federal office for Migration and Integration initiated an “integration panel” which started in 2007 with a focus 
on the effect of language course participation on language ability. Even in this study, no objective language 
evaluation was possible due to legal uncertainties and the absence of a coherent test scheme (Rother, 2008). 
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years in the country. Educational attainments are rather low (at nine years of schooling) which is 
consistent with the fact that the vast majority of educational degrees was attained in the home 
country. The gender mix as well as the common presence of children in immigrant households 
reflect the migration for family unification, which became dominant after the recruitment stop in 
1973. 
Given the scope of the guest-worker programme it might be surprising that the German 
government never collected detailed information on where guest-workers moved and for how 
long they stayed, leaving us with general data sources. To generate ethnic concentration 
measures, we use the IAB
9
 Beschäftigtenstichprobe of 1975, a two percent sample of all persons 
with social security insurance in Germany. This employee-sample comprises 2% of the entire 
employee population plus recipients of certain social transfers like unemployment benefits. 
Employers mandatorily register employees for the payment of social security taxes, so that 
employees can be tracked through their social security numbers until dropping out of the labour 
force. 
 
                                                 
9
 The research institute affiliated with the Federal Employment Agency of Germany. 
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Instrumental variable approach 
Although the placement of immigrants in Germany was exogenous to them, they were 
in reality allowed to move after one year of work (including being allowed to return). However, 
until the economic recession in mid 1970s, guest-workers would move only to follow labour 
demand, and normally only short distances (i.e., within region). These moves must be understood 
as steps towards settling down in Germany, after many guest-workers had spent the first time in 
employer-provided accommodation. The fact that immigrants moved across regions might imply 
that the propensity to move into ethnically homogeneous regions (enclaves) is correlated with 
some unobservable characteristics of migrants. For instance, migrants who are less able or willing 
to learn German could self-select into ethnic clusters in order to reduce the costs adherent to 
absent language skills. If this was the case we would expect naive OLS estimates of the enclave 
effect to be biased away from zero. 
To overcome this bias, we use an instrumental variable approach where we estimate the 
following system of equations: 
 
ezx
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       (8) 
 
where z is the instrument which satisfies the assumptions Cov(z, x) ≠ 0 and Cov(z, u) = 
0. The IV estimator 
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can be interpreted as the ratio between the reduced form relationship between y and z 
over the first stage relationship of y and x. The main instrument used in this application is the 
ethnic composition of regions in 1975, thus ten years before our language ability measures were 
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taken and at the time when the guest-worker programme had just come to an end. At this time, 
the placement of guest-workers was still predominantly exogenous to them, implying that z is 
uncorrelated with any unobservable factors that are accumulated in u.  
We identify the effect of ethnic concentration on language acquisition through the use 
of the exogenous 1975 ethnic composition as an instrument for ethnic concentrations in 1985, the 
earliest year for which we have a sample of immigrants with German proficiency and residence 
county information. The identifying assumption is that until 1975 the guest-workers have not 
changed their locations according to characteristics that are correlated with the ability or 
willingness to learn German. We do not need to assume that guest-workers never moved, but that 
whatever influenced their moving decision (if they moved) was not correlated with unobservable 
characteristics influencing the learning decision. Given the economic boom until 1973 and the 
pervasively low levels of education and skills among the guest-workers, we do not expect much 
sorting across regions until 1975; since transitions from one employer to another were most likely 
to happen within rather than across regions, it helps that regions are defined at a fairly aggregate 
level (discussed in the next section). 
Our instrument might contain measurement error, as we instrument the ethnic 
concentration exposure in 1985 with the regional concentration of 1975, although we cannot 
observe individual places of residence in 1975. This is potentially problematic if guest-workers 
have moved within this ten year period, and in consequence ethnic concentrations have become 
stronger for those who were not likely to learn German in the first place. Using data from the 
employee-sample of the IAB we investigate whether there are systematic differences in the 
exposure to ethnic concentration before and after moving across regions. 
We base our calculations on all guest-workers who were present in the sample in 1975 
and in 1984, and who “moved”; those are migrants who were registered for work (or benefit 
receipt) in different regions in 1975 and 1984. We base our analysis on the workplace location 
rather than residence, because of higher non-responses for the latter.
10
 We observe that 17% of 
the guest-workers have moved across regions between 1975 and 1984, as compared to 14% of 
German nationals.
11
 Some but not the entire differential is due to the fact that the immigrants who 
                                                 
10
 Reporting residence was not mandatory. 
11
 When looking at inter-regional moves, the level of mobility seems low when compared to the USA. 
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moved were predominantly younger and male. Fifty two percent of those who moved turned to 
neighbouring regions. 
We also construct a variable DIFF defined on guest-workers who moved between 1975 
and 1984, which is the difference in the regional ethnic concentration that a guest-worker 
experienced between 1975 and 1984. For example, if a Turk lived in Munich in 1975 and in 
Berlin in 1984, DIFF would be the concentration of Turks in Berlin in 1984 minus the 
concentration of Turks in Munich in 1984. Thus, the change in concentration after moving cannot 
be attributed to differential trends in the overall population of different immigrant groups. Figure 
4 plots the density distribution of changes in ethnic concentration (DIFF) of 2,523 guest-workers 
in the IAB sample who moved between 1975 and 1984. The distribution peaks around zero (the 
mean of DIFF being 0.0036) and has somewhat more mass to the right. For 54% of the movers 
the concentration of their own ethnic group changed by less than one percentage point and for 
70% by less than 1.5 percentage points.  
>> Figure 4 about here << 
It could still be the case though, that guest-workers who moved to regions with lower 
concentrations differ systematically from those who moved to higher concentration locations. We 
thus regress the variable DIFF on educational attainment, age, and nationality dummies (all as 
reported in 1984). If systematic sorting was present, we would expect educational attainment and 
age to correlate (albeit imperfectly) with ability or willingness to learn German. For this test we 
group the educational information in four categories, educ1 being education less than high-school 
(Gymnasium, qualifying for college) without vocational training, educ2 high-school degree or 
vocational training (but not both), educ3 high-school degree and vocational training, and educ4 
college degree.  
>> Table 2 about here << 
Table 2 reports these OLS results, with educ4 and the Greek dummy being the omitted 
categories. If anything, lower educational attainments show some weak correlation with a 
positive change in ethnic concentration, although none of the dummies is significant at 
conventional levels. The size of coefficients is very small, and the mean change in concentrations 
for guest-workers with the lowest education remains below two tenths of a percentage point when 
compared to workers with college degrees. Age seems to be irrelevant. Turks and Yugoslavs 
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were more likely to move to regions with higher concentrations, but here, too, the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are modest. When we include interactions between ethnic and educational 
category dummies (column 2), even the ethnic dummies lose their significance (none of the 
interactions comes close to significance). In general, the variable DIFF is explained very poorly 
by the regression, with R² not even reaching 0.02. We conclude that sorting of guest-workers 
along any observable characteristics has been absent or very modest between 1975 and 1985.  
To further test the validity of our instrument we also employ a second variable, the 
regional election result of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in the national 
elections of 1976. This instrument is sufficiently correlated with the 1985 ethnic composition of 
regions, as guest-workers were predominantly placed in regions with dominant mining and heavy 
industry sectors, which were traditional strongholds of the SPD. Beyond the link through ethnic 
composition, the instrument is not correlated with individual language ability, as guest-workers 
were not entitled to vote in the national election unless having adopted German citizenship. At 
that time, this was true only for a negligible fraction of guest-workers and language knowledge 
was no criterion for the admission to German citizenship. Additionally, the political landscape in 
Germany largely ignored the fact that guest-workers were starting to settle down and that the 
intended „rotation principle“ of the migration flows (guest-workers should return after a first 
employment spell) never came into effect. Consequently, none of the political parties broached 
the issue of integration or language policy at that time. 
 
Choice of regional level of aggregation 
Conditional on data availability, ethnic concentrations can be measured at several 
levels of aggregation. However, there is a qualitative trade-off between small units of aggregation 
that closely reflect the idea of ethnic neighbourhoods (e.g., census tracts in the US ghettoisation 
literature with an average size of three to five thousand inhabitants; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; or 
municipalities in Sweden with a median population size of 16,000 inhabitants; Edin, Frederiksson 
and Aslund, 2003) and larger units, that circumvent the potential bias from self-selection into 
neighbourhoods (e.g., through the use of metropolitan level data (CMA); Warman, 2007; Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor, 2008). The latter approach assumes that the problematic self-selection of 
individuals into ethnic enclaves mainly takes place within cities rather than across. In our analysis 
we use so-called Anpassungsschichten, which are regional units comprising a larger city and the 
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economically linked hinterland. In West Germany including West Berlin, there were 111 
Anpassungsschichten in 1985 with an average population size between 135 and 500 thousand 
inhabitants, respectively. By including Anpassungsschicht and ethnicity fixed effects, we exploit 
only variation in ethnic concentrations that is not systematic across ethnicities or across regions. 
If the chosen level of aggregation effectively reduced the bias from sorting, our OLS estimates 
should be very close to the true effect of own-ethnic concentration.  
 
5. Results 
In the following we provide empirical evidence of a German language penalty from 
living among members of the same ethnicity which is robust when accounting for the 
endogeneity of immigrants’ post-initial-placement location choice. Figure 5 gives an initial idea 
of the correlation between ethnic concentration in the location of immigrants (here the log of the 
normalised frequency) and their average language fluency in German (as a share of immigrants 
who speak German well or very well). The correlation between the two variables of interest is 
negative, with the variance across regions being substantial. It becomes evident that larger 
regions contain higher ethnic concentrations. 
>> Figure 5 about here << 
 
Main results 
Table 3 indicates that there is a significantly negative return to language fluency from 
living in an area with higher own-ethnic concentration. When including control variables, the 
coefficient becomes more pronounced and is -0.037.
12
 Equivalently, if the ethnic concentration 
increases by one standard deviation, the probability that a person is fluent in German decreases 
by 2.6 percent. Although the effect of own-ethnic concentration might seem small at first, one has 
to consider the high level of aggregation it refers to. Other authors have found similar effects at 
high levels of aggregation for the USA (Chiswick and Miller, 2005) or Canada (Warman, 2007). 
The table further reports results from specification (2) which comprises an instrumental variable 
                                                 
12
 The largest part of the effect stems from variation across regions (50 percent). Thirty-nine percent of the effect is 
due to variation across ethnicities.  
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approach. The use of the instrument (in columns 3 and 4) returns a very similar coefficient, 
modestly further from zero than our OLS estimate.13  
>> Table 3 about here << 
Table 4 reports results from the same estimations using writing fluency as the 
dependent variable. Interestingly, the concentration effects are equally precisely measured when 
compared to Table 3, however, the effects are substantially closer to zero and significantly 
different thereof only in the IV estimation (columns 3 and 4). In Table 5, we repeat the analysis 
of speaking fluency and test the robustness of our results by using alternative measures of ethnic 
concentration. Columns 1 and 4 use the absolute number of own-ethnic minority members, which 
simply reflects a transformation of our initial results (see also theory section). The remaining 
columns use alternative measures of ethnic concentrations. The dissimilarity index ranges 
between zero and one with the corner solution representing the state of perfectly equal 
distribution across space and the state of perfect concentration of all minority members in one 
region.
14
 The isolation index is a measure ranging between zero and one which reflects the degree 
of isolation which an average member of an ethnicity faces on top of the equal distribution of this 
ethnicity across space.15 As can be seen from Table 5, our results are robust to the use of 
alternative measures of ethnic concentration or segregation; two-stage-least-squares estimators 
are consistently more negative than the OLS estimates. 
>> Table 4 about here << 
>> Table 5 about here << 
In Table 6 we add further robustness concerning our dependent variable. So far, we 
have used a binary indicator for speaking and writing fluency. These variables are, however, 
generated from ordinal rankings of five answer categories. Columns 1 and 2 report basic results 
                                                 
13
 We also use a variety of transformations of this instrument (e.g., ranks) yielding qualitatively the same results. 
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for OLS regressions that use the full information of the language self-assessment. Although the 
coefficients are hard to interpret, one can infer the robustness of our results from them.16 
Columns 3 to 6 use a transformed binary concentration measure that takes the value one if the 
ethnic concentration of an ethnicity in a region lies above the 75th percentile of the entire ethnic 
concentration distribution, and zero otherwise. Due to the loss of information, the precision of the 
estimation in column 3 is lower compared to the one with continuous concentration measures. As 
column 4 shows the contact rate with natives might matter more for language acquisition than 
simply living in own-ethnicity enclaves. Although living with fewer Germans outside enclaves 
might be beneficial for language acquisition,
17
 the absence of native speakers inside enclaves has 
a strongly negative impact on language knowledge. Columns 5 and 6 report differential effects 
for older and younger migrants according to their age at migration. The comparison of both 
columns shows that older immigrants bear most of the negative impact from enclaves while those 
who immigrated at younger age have no disadvantage from living in an enclave; these results 
reconfirm findings for other countries (Warman, 2007). The joint coefficient of a young 
immigrant in an enclave is significantly positive 0.092 (s.e. 0.049). 
>> Table 6 about here << 
Table 7 shows further instrumental variable estimation results. Given the relatively 
small sample size, we prefer the use of only one instrument. However, we have a second 
instrument at hand with which to test for over identification of the equation. Using only the 
second instrument—the election outcome for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in 
1976—the 2SLS estimator becomes even more negative. Employing both instruments at once we 
produce an over identified model: the estimated coefficient moves very close to our initial result 
and the Hanson test statistics confirms that our instruments satisfy the orthogonality condition. 
Even when introducing a number of interactions (column 4) we cannot clearly reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are invalid. Columns 5 and 6 produce the reduced form results for 
both instruments. 
>> Table 7 about here << 
                                                 
16
 The results are also robust to the use of ordered probit estimation. 
17
 Generally, immigrants tend to have more social contacts with other immigrants irrespective of ethnicity. As a 
result, German might be the language of communication among immigrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
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>> Table 8 about here << 
Table 8 adds evidence from a non-parametric perspective. We perform nearest 
neighbour propensity score matching to generate the closest counterfactuals of our observations 
artificially.
18
 For two different binary treatment variables, the first line reports the result without 
matching. The remaining rows are different versions of the matching estimator employing 
different numbers of nearest neighbours. As evidenced in the table, applying the matching 
estimator increases the language ability of the control group, i.e. in the unmatched sample we 
underestimate the language ability of those residing outside enclaves. Also, the average treatment 
effects are clearly significant, lending further robustness to our earlier results. 
 
6. Measurement Error 
The model estimated in (7) has several sources of potential measurement error which 
will be discussed in this section. More specifically, we wish to explain the fact that 2SLS 
estimates are more negative than standard OLS results. 
Models using language ability as an explanatory variable (e.g., in wage regressions) 
have discussed the measurement error inherent to self-assessed language knowledge (Dustmann 
and van Soest, 2001; Bleakley and Chin, 2004). Survey respondents might generally misjudge 
their language ability, and the deviation of self-assessed from “objective” fluency might be 
correlated with level of education (i.e., better educated might have a better idea of their true 
language ability) and level of language ability (i.e., those in the upper part of the fluency 
distribution have less room for over-estimating their ability with the reverse being true for the 
other extreme of the fluency distribution).
19
 In our application, language fluency is, however, the 
dependent variable and measurement error herein reduces precision while it does not introduce 
any bias into the estimates. This can be seen from estimating the basic model 
 
uxy ++= βα*  
                                                 
18
 The matching estimators are well-fitted with full support. 
19
 In our sample, there is a strong central tendency in the five category Likert scale with only 15 percent of 
respondents claiming to have no (category 1) or very good (category 5) language ability. 
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where y* is the observed dependent variable which however relates to the true 
dependent variable in the following way: 
 
eyy true +=*  
 
where e is a random error term. Estimating the variance of the coefficient of interest 
yields 
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implying a larger than true coefficient variance and standard error. 
More serious than in the dependent variable is measurement error in independent 
variables as it may bias the estimated coefficients. As such, this type of error might potentially 
drive OLS estimates closer to zero and explain our finding of more negative 2SLS estimates. Our 
ethnic concentration measures are computed for five ethnicities (Greek, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, 
and Yugoslav) from the IAB Employee sample 1985 which comprises two percent of all 
individuals with social security insurance in Germany. It seems reasonable to assume that these 
densities suffer from measurement error, especially in regions which comprise a generally low 
share of foreign population or few individuals of one single ethnicity. In support of these 
measures, it should be noted that social security insurance was compulsory in Germany at that 
time (and still is) and that unemployed individuals are also included in the sample. Further, due to 
the demand-driven nature of the guest-worker programme, ethnic minorities were more equally 
distributed across German regions than one would expect under more labour supply driven 
arrangements. As such, the extent of measurement error is probably not correlated with 
characteristics of the region other than size and thus should be of little concern in our estimation. 
Attenuation bias towards zero could be shown in our data when the instrument has 
better measurement properties than the original density measures. In our case, this seems rather 
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unlikely, as the instrument (ethnic concentration measured from IAB sample 1975) comes from 
the same data source as our original variable that is potentially plagued by measurement error. In 
order to show that this type of error is of less importance here, we use another instrument that 
does not suffer from the problem: The regional election outcomes of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) of Germany in the year 1976. 
>> Table 9 about here << 
As both sources of measurement error seem not responsible for the observed outcome, 
we turn to a last potential solution. Given that the 2SLS estimates exploit only variation in ethnic 
concentration across space and ethnicities that was present in 1975, while OLS estimates rely on 
the respective variation for 1985, a change in this variation might result in different outcomes. In 
other words, if the fluency penalty from ethnic concentration differs in the 1975 sample from the 
1985 population, OLS and 2SLS will differ for qualitative reasons (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). If 
immigrants moved across regions between 1975 and 1985 in a non-random fashion, our 
instrumental variable approach will only estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) for 
those who did not intend to move. A useful check whether “stayers” suffer stronger from ethnic 
concentration can be performed by exploiting information on the year when the immigrant 
household moved to the current place of residence. The full retrospective information is only 
available in the first wave of the GSOEP (1984) and that is why we lose some observations. As 
Table 9 suggests, migrants who live longer at their current place of residence have much more 
negative coefficients on the ethnic concentration measures. It should be noted, that although this 
piece of evidence indicates that the language penalty differs with the propensity to have moved, it 
cannot answer the question whether people moved voluntarily (i.e., sorting) and whether they 
moved across regional units. However, if we did not account for  sorting of immigrants who were 
less willing or able (omitted variable x2) to learn German into ethnic enclaves (x1), then the ethnic 
concentration measure will overestimate the true penalty on learning German since x2 is expected 
to be negative for language fluency and Corr(x1, x2) > 0. When estimating a reduced form 
regression with the instrument rather than the ethnic concentration measure of 1985, we indeed 
find a slightly lower coefficient of -0.030 instead of -0.037. While being present in our data, 
sorting over time accounts for less than 20 percent of the coefficient. 
 
7. Policy Simulation  
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The regressions reported in Section 5 and 6 aimed at identifying and quantifying the 
effect of ethnic concentrations on language proficiency. As we have discussed in the theoretical 
part of the paper, the effect of a rise in ethnic concentration on an immobile immigrant’s 
propensity to learn German (the case in the previous sections) will typically be different from the 
impact if the immigrant can move across regions. From a policy perspective the latter case is of 
more relevance. Furthermore, we showed that changes in the concentration impact stronger on 
the location conditioned probability of learning German as compared to the unconditional 
probability, at least for low fx .  
It is thus interesting to study how learning and location choices would have behaved 
under different scenarios of ethnic concentrations and individual characteristics. To this avail, we 
estimate the model outlined in Section 2 as a multinomial choice model and use the estimated 
parameters to perform some model simulations on counterfactual distributions of immigrants 
across regions and educational attainments.  
We conduct this exercise on a more recent sample of immigrants (the 2001 wave of the 
GSOEP). Above we had used the 1985 wave of the panel to reduce as much measurement error 
in our instrument as possible. The experiments, however, are more relevant for recent data, 
because we now observe immigrants whose decisions to live in Germany have become 
permanent and who arguably had the chance to settle in a region of their own choice.  
 
Multinomial Logit Model 
Recall that a choice alternative is given by a pair of learning and location decisions. If 
the j
iω  in equation (5) are distributed type I extreme value, the choice probabilities are the ones 
given in equation (6), resulting in the well-known multinomial logit model. The properties of this 
model are discussed at length in McFadden (1974). The model is consistent with a globally 
concave likelihood function. Importantly, consistency is preserved when the estimation is 
performed on a subset of choice alternatives, a pivotal property when the choice-set for 
optimizing agents is very large. In our case, the choice-set consists of all possible learning-
location decisions (with approximately 90 observed locations there are 180 alternatives). For the 
analysis we have conducted estimations on all chosen plus four additional randomly selected 
alternative locations (without replacement), amounting to ten distinct ),( jS  choice pairs. We 
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have also performed estimation on two, three, and four locations to test the robustness of our 
estimates in dependence of the choice size, with only negligible differences in the results. The 
preservation of consistency is guaranteed by the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives feature 
of the multinomial logit model. At the same time, this is an important limitation of the model, 
since we would expect that “shocks” to the same learning decisions (in different locations) are 
correlated. In other words, if an immigrant is likely to learn German in location j, we would 
expect him to be likely to learn German in all other locations, too. The multinomial logit does not 
allow for such a correlation structure. 
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Multinomial Probit Model 
If we assume the random variables ( ji
j
i r,ε ) to be i.i.d. normal with standard deviations 
rσσ ε , , the model to be estimated is a multinomial probit. The mean vector can be set to zero 
without loss of generality, since the X in equation (1) contain a constant and the choice of one 
location over another is not affected by a level shift of utilities. To understand our estimation 
routine, consider a choice-set with two locations: we can stack the alternatives as “location 1, not 
learn”, “location 1, learn”, “location 2, not learn”, and “location 2, learn”. Suppressing the 
individual index and letting the unobserved learning cost ε  be location-independent, the 
corresponding random vector of ω  and its variance-covariance matrix are: 
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This covariance structure yields two desirable features. First, an immigrant who has a 
high shock to learning German in one location is also likely to have a high shock to learning in 
other locations (the immigrant being of a specific learner-type). Second, an immigrant who has a 
high shock to “not learning in location j” is likely to have a high shock for “learning in location j” 
(there being reasons drawing the immigrant to the location, regardless of ethnic concentrations 
and learning costs). Estimation is slightly more complicated than in the multinomial logit case, 
since the choice probabilities in equation (5) do no longer have a closed form solution. Instead, 
the probabilities are approximated via simulation. The estimation algorithm for the two times k 
choices (for k regions) consists of the following steps (see Train (2003) for a discussion of 
simulation-based estimations of multinomial choice models): 
1. Construct the ( )kk 22 ×  matrix L such that )(Ω=VLLT . This ensures 
positive definiteness of the variance matrix. L consists of two distinct elements (apart 
from the zeros). One of them is normalised such that 1=εσ , since rσ  and εσ  are not 
separately identified. 
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2. For every observation, draw a vector of two times k random numbers from 
the joint normal distribution ( ))(,0 ΩVN . Calculate all ),( jSU from equation (3).  
3. To have a smooth probability (rather than a step-function by just counting 
the number of times an alternative is chosen), calculate 
∑ ∑=
=
}1,0{ ),(
),(
)/exp(
)/exp(
s k ks
jS
U
U
R
λ
λ
 
where λ  can be any number between zero and one.  
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 N times and average the N “probabilities” R to obtain 
∑=
∧
RNP )/1( , an approximation to equation (5).  
 
Importantly, the random numbers drawn for each individual should remain constant 
over all iterations of the maximization routine. We have set the number of simulation steps N to 
20,000. The higher we set N, the closer we approximate the “true” probabilities, at the cost of 
longer computation time. All estimations are performed with maximum likelihood on the 
(simulated) probabilities.  
 
Simulation Results  
Since estimation of the full multinomial probit model is very time-intensive, we 
decided to use a parsimonious specification of the choice model. The X in equation (1) thus 
include a constant, age at migration, years since migration, years of education, and a dummy for 
having obtained the highest educational degree in the country of origin, all of which were 
significant predictors of language proficiency in an OLS framework. The W in equation (3) 
contains two variables: total regional population which is precisely projected from the German 
Microcensus of the year 2000 and normalised to one for the least populous region, and the 
regional unemployment rate which is aggregated over county data from the German Federal 
Employment Services. Finally, the payoff function in equation (3), ξ , is specified as a quadratic 
function in its argument, not including a constant. As is standard, the variance of the 
unobservable part of utility is normalised to 
6
2π
 in the multinomial logit case. For the probit 
model we normalise the variance of ε  to one, and implicitly estimate the variance of r. Thus, we 
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estimate nine parameters for the logit, and ten parameters for the probit case. Our preferred model 
is the probit, since it allows for a richer (and more realistic) covariance structure, but for 
comparison and because of the computational burden of finding standard errors in the probit 
model we report results of both specifications.   
Estimates are reported in Table 10. Both the multinomial logit and probit yield identical 
signs on all coefficients. The payoff function ξ  is concave and attains its maximum at an ethnic 
concentration of approximately 75% in both cases. A higher unemployment rate reduces the 
probability of living in the corresponding region, whereas a larger total population size increases 
it. Years since migration and years of schooling reduce the cost of language learning, while a 
higher age at migration and a foreign educational degree increase the cost. We do not report 
standard errors for our probit model, since we have no closed form solution for the derivative of 
the likelihood-function, and bootstrap-methods would be too computation-intensive. However, 
standard errors from the logit model should provide some guidance for the relative importance of 
the variables. First, the effects of own ethnic concentration is estimated with considerable 
precision. Second, the coefficients on regional characteristics have low standard errors, too. 
Third, the coefficient on years of schooling is most precisely estimated among the learning-cost 
variables; its value suggests a prominent role of education in determining the cost of learning 
German. Both models suggest that one additional year of schooling reduces learning costs in a 
magnitude comparable to 10 to 12 additional years of residence in Germany. 
>> Table 10 about here << 
Figure 6 compares the concentration effects on the probability to learn German for the 
multinomial choice results (as given in the first part of proposition 1, that is, conditional on 
location) and an OLS regression of language proficiency (as given in our benchmark regressions 
reported earlier). It should be noted that the OLS coefficient from the 2001 sample (-0.045) is 
higher in absolute terms than the coefficient obtained from the 1985 wave (-0.037). This is 
consistent with sorting of high-learning cost immigrants into regions with high ethnic 
concentrations between 1985 and 2001. As expected, the treatment effect over a wide range of 
concentrations is smaller in both choice models. For our preferred probit specification, the 
derivative of )|1( jSP =  at an own-ethnicity concentration of 3% is -3.9. Furthermore, the probit 
model exhibits a smaller treatment effect at all concentrations, whereas the logit model has higher 
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marginal effects of concentration on German proficiency for lower concentrations, as can be seen 
by the steeper slope of the logit curve at low concentrations.  
>> Figure 6 about here << 
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Counterfactuals 
Which level of language proficiency would prevail, if Germany had been able to place 
immigrants in specific regions to equalise their distribution across German regions? Or, if 
Germany had been screening guest-worker applicants by their level of education? To answer 
these questions we simulate four different scenarios with the help of our probit estimates: The 
first is the “real” world. We simulate the learning and location model 500 times and compare four 
simulated moments to the actual data. The second scenario is an equal distribution of all ethnic 
groups over the country; that is replacing actual ethnic concentrations in the regions by the West-
German average (as a placement policy might have done). In the third case we increase each 
immigrant’s education by one year of schooling. Finally, we simulate a one percentage point 
increase of own-ethnic concentrations in each region.  
The main outcome of interest is the fraction of first-generation immigrants deciding to 
learn German across the different scenarios. The other three moments are plausibility checks of 
our model: we report the fraction of our sample deciding to live in the region with the largest 
population, which is Berlin. Berlin is an “outlier” among all regions, with its population at least 
doubling the population of any other of the 86 regions. Consequently, the capital is chosen most 
often in our benchmark simulations and the fraction of immigrants deciding to live there indicates 
the degree of clustering. A further indicator for clustering is the number of regions chosen by at 
least one observation of our sample, with 88 being the maximum. Finally, we also look at the 
fraction of immigrants in Berlin who decide to learn German.  
>> Table 11 about here << 
Results of our experiments are reported in Table 11 together with the real data 
moments. The reported numbers are averaged over 500 simulations, with standard deviations in 
parentheses. For example, 46.7% of the sample decide to learn German in our model simulation 
(column 1), coinciding almost exactly with the true fraction of German-speakers. 7.4% decide to 
live in Berlin, out of which 44.2% learn German. The actual share of immigrants residing in 
Berlin in all immigrants in West Germany is 5.3%, so that our model slightly overestimates the 
attraction of this region. Most regions are chosen by at least one immigrant.  
When moving from those results to an equal distribution of immigrants throughout 
Germany, the effect on language proficiency is positive, but small. In other words, immigrants 
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who are treated with a lower immigrant share than in the benchmark scenario are those, who had 
high learning costs to begin with. Even though the incentive has increased after equalizing the 
concentrations, only few of them are induced to learn German.  
To the opposite, the increased education scenario leads to a considerable improvement 
in German proficiency. The fraction of German learners increases by 6 percentage points 
compared to the benchmark, without effecting the distribution of immigrants across Germany 
much. Regional factors (population and unemployment) largely determine the preference over 
regions. Berlin and other populous regions are chosen most often, and within those regions the 
share of speakers increases. Of those immigrants choosing to live in Berlin, 49.8% learn German 
now as compared to the benchmark share of 44.2%. 
Finally, an increase in own-ethnic concentrations by one percentage point in all regions 
leads to a decrease in language proficiency by 3.7 percentage points, which is just about the 
change in the probability of learning German conditional on location. Given the near-linearity of 
the concentration effect (see Figure 6) this is not surprising: For the learning decision a common 
increase of concentrations across regions should yield the same effect as an equivalent increase in 
the actual location while being locked in. A closer look at the choices of immigrants under this 
scenario reveals that clustering in higher-concentration areas becomes now more pronounced. 
Berlin is preferred only second most often despite its large population. More immigrants decide 
to move to a region around the city of Stuttgart
20
. This region comprises a population of 2 million 
inhabitants and is characterized by low unemployment and above-Berlin concentration levels for 
all ethnic groups except for Turks. The concentrations of the Turkish population in Berlin and the 
region around Stuttgart are about the same. Some immigrants who found it optimal to learn 
German are now induced not to learn, and thus the relative importance of the ethnic concentration 
in the settlement choice increases, making high concentration areas more of a drawing magnet.    
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper is the first attempt to investigate the effect of own-ethnic regional 
concentration on the language ability of immigrants in Germany theoretically and empirically. 
Using the example of the guest-workers who were paired with German firms exogenously, we 
                                                 
20
 The region consists of the counties Böblingen, Esslingen, Göppingen, Ludwigsburg, and Rems-Murr-Kreis. 
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find small but negative causal effects from living among immigrants from the same country of 
origin in the mid 1980s. The effect becomes slightly larger after addressing potential sorting into 
enclaves with an instrumental variable approach. We discuss several sources of measurement 
error and conclude that the instrument produces a local average treatment effect (LATE). 
The paper provides a simple random utility model which allows for simultaneous 
learning and location choices. Using estimated parameters to simulate the effect of own-ethnic 
concentration on language ability suggests a lower impact than estimated by a simple OLS 
strategy. Applying the model on more recent data from Germany, we find an increased tendency 
for immigrants to sort into regions with co-nationals. Generally, an additional year of education 
increases the propensity that immigrants learn German much stronger than would a placement 
policy that produces equal ethnic distributions of immigrants across Germany. Despite finding a 
negative effect from own-ethnic concentration on language ability, we conclude that public 
policy might achieve better integration outcomes by targeting education levels rather than 
location choices. 
Finally, more disaggregated research on ethnic enclaves in Germany would be 
desirable; however, the lack of highly disaggregated data prevents deeper investigations. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Earnings and regional ethnic concentration (x) 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of foreign population in Germany 
 
Source: Herbert (2001), pp. 198-199, and Bauer, Dietz et al. (2005). 
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Figure 3: Absolute number of foreign population by source country 
 
Source: Herbert (2001), pp. 198-199, and Bauer, Dietz et al. (2005). 
 
Figure 4: Kernel density estimate of ethnic concentration change over time (DIFF) 
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Source: IAB employee sample 1975 and 1984; authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Correlation between own ethnic concentration and average speaking ability 
 
  
Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 6: Estimated learning probabilities across estimators 
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Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Number of 
observations Mean 
Speak German 2346 42.3% 
Write German 2339 45.0% 
Male 2346 55.6% 
Age at migration 2346 23.39 
Years since migration 2346 14.62 
Years of schooling 2346 9.08 
Schooling abroad 2346 83.6% 
Married 2346 78.8% 
Children in household 2346 64.4% 
Turkish 2346 34.3% 
Yugoslav 2346 19.0% 
Italian 2346 19.6% 
Spanish 2346 12.3% 
Greek 2346 14.8% 
Source: GSOEP 1985; authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of DIFF 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS 
      
Educ1 0.0013 0.0027 
 (0.0008) (0.0058) 
Educ2 -0.0001 0.0012 
 (0.0009) (0.0049) 
Educ3 0.0016 0.0094 
 (0.0037) (0.0152) 
Age -2.04E-06 2.10E-06 
 (3.85E-05) (4.00E-05) 
Turkish  0.0029** 0.0051 
 (0.0012) (0.0057) 
Italian -0.0002 -0.0013 
 (0.0014) (0.0019) 
Jugoslav 0.0037*** 0.0032 
 (0.0012) (0.0057) 
Spanish -0.0008 -0.0001 
 (0.0019) (0.0038) 
Interactions no yes 
Constant 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.002) (0.0057) 
Observations 2523 2523 
R-squared 0.012 0.016 
Note: Dependent variable: DIFF = difference in ethnic concentration of individual specific region 
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of residence between 1975 and 1985. Omitted categories: educ4 and Greek nationals. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: IAB 1975/1985; authors’ 
calculations.
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Table 3: Determinants of speaking ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS First stage 2SLS 
     
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.025*** -0.037***  -0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Male  0.099*** 0.001 0.099*** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
Age at migration  -0.035*** 0.005** -0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ.  0.036*** -0.009* 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Years since migration  0.009*** -0.001 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Years of schooling  0.052*** -0.002 0.052*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.040* -0.042*** -0.040* 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Married  -0.119*** -0.027 -0.119*** 
  (0.028) (0.018) (0.027) 
Children in household  0.013 -0.005 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.019) 
1975 Frequency of own 
ethnic. 
  0.718***  
   (0.009)  
Constant 0.460*** 0.200** 0.459*** 0.226*** 
 (0.056) (0.080) (0.054) (0.081) 
Observations 2346 2346 2346 2346 
R-squared 0.258 0.360 0.968 0.360 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, 
speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed 
effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1975/1985; authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 4: Determinants of writing ability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS First stage 2SLS 
     
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.007 -0.021  -0.036** 
 (0.009) (0.014)  (0.015) 
Male  0.093*** 0.001 0.093*** 
  (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) 
Age at migration  -0.035*** 0.005** -0.035*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ.  0.036*** -0.009* 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Years since migration  0.010*** -0.001 0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Years of schooling  0.066*** -0.002 0.066*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.046** -0.042*** -0.046** 
  (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) 
Married  -0.122*** -0.027 -0.122*** 
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.026) 
Children in household  0.044** -0.005 0.043** 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) 
1975 Frequency of own 
ethnic. 
  0.718***  
   (0.009)  
Constant 0.962** 0.325 0.459*** 0.327 
 (0.415) (0.356) (0.054) (0.349) 
Observations 2339 2339 2339 2339 
R-squared 0.257 0.378 0.968 0.377 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of writing ability (Writing very good or good = 1, 
writing fair, poor or not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed 
effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1975/1985; authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 5: Determinants of speaking ability; robustness check with alternative enclave measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
       
Number of members of 
ethnicity 
-0.036***   -0.053***   
 (0.012)   (0.016)   
Dissimilarity index  -1.471***   -2.776**  
  (0.498)   (1.137)  
Log of Isolation index   -0.015*   -0.085** 
   (0.008)   (0.035) 
Male 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad -0.040* -0.035 -0.036 -0.040* -0.033 -0.042* 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
Married -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.117*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
Children in household 0.012 -0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Constant 0.743*** -0.989* -0.948* 0.846*** -1.147** -2.058*** 
 (0.112) (0.573) (0.576) (0.137) (0.585) (0.786) 
Observations 2346 2282 2278 2346 2282 2278 
Instrument no no no yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.361 0.309 0.307 0.360 0.306 0.281 
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Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). 
Instrument is: 1975 Frequency of own ethnicity. All regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects. Regressions (1), (4) and (5) control for 
fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany, all other regressions control for regional unemployment rate and log 
of regional income level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 
1975/1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6: Determinants of speaking ability; robustness checks and extensions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Five-scale ordinal variable 
 
Binary variable: Speaking 
 
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.078*** -0.064**     
 (0.019) (0.027)     
Enclave (Own ethnic concentration above 
p75) 
  -0.040* 0.002 -0.060** 0.032 
   (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) (0.038) 
Frequency of Germans below p75    0.086***   
    (0.028)   
Enclave*Freq. of Germans below p75    -0.131***   
    (0.044)   
Immigrated at young age (16 or below)     0.066  
     (0.043)  
Enclave*Immigrated at young age (16 or 
below) 
    0.085**  
     (0.044)  
Immigrated as adult      -0.060 
      (0.042) 
Enclave*Immigrated as adult      -0.099** 
      (0.043) 
Male  0.214*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 
  (0.033) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age at migration  -0.058*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age at migration squ.  0.031** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
  (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Years since migration  0.031*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Years of schooling  0.118*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad  -0.046 -0.040* -0.043* -0.055** -0.057** 
  (0.048) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married  -0.309*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.111*** 
  (0.052) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Children in household  -0.010 -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 
  (0.038) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 4.086*** 3.063*** -1.031* -0.984* -1.141** -1.049* 
 (0.132) (0.156) (0.571) (0.562) (0.565) (0.559) 
Observations 2346 2346 2282 2340 2340 2340 
R-squared 0.324 0.454 0.308 0.316 0.315 0.316 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). 
Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985 and IAB 1985; authors’ calculations. 
  
54 
Table 7: Results with alternative and multiple instruments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Reduced 
form 
Reduced 
form 
       
Frequency of own ethnicity (instrumented) -0.039*** -0.068** -0.040*** -0.034**   
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.012) (0.014)   
1975 Frequency of own ethnicity; (1)     -0.028***  
     (0.011)  
SPD election result; (2)      -0.025** 
      (0.011) 
Male 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of schooling 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Schooling abroad -0.039*** -0.040* -0.039*** -0.039* -0.037 -0.038* 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Married -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Children in household 0.011* 0.009 0.011* 0.011 0.011 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant -1.949*** -1.852** -1.947*** -1.967** -1.319 -0.679 
 (0.514) (0.800) (0.514) (1.000) (1.091) 
 
(1.042) 
Instruments (1) (2) rank(1),  
rank(2) 
(2) and 
interaction 
rank(2)* 
  
  
55 
pop size 
Number of instruments 1 1 2 60   
Hanson overidentification test, p-value — — 0.959 0.163   
Observations 2340 2340 2340 2340 2340 2340 
R-squared 0.364 0.362 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.362 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). 
Instrument (1) is the own-ethnic concentration of the year 1975. Instrument (2) is the election outcome of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD) in the 1976 national elections. Note that there are six missing observations for instrument (2). Therefore all regressions 
are performed on a slightly smaller sample than in Table 3, which explains the small differences in estimates. Regressions control for 
ethnicity fixed effects and fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 1975/1985 and official results of the Bundestag elections 1976; authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 8: Propensity score matching results 
 
Treatment Variable 
(1) Sample 
Treate
d Controls 
Differenc
e s.e. T-stat 
Frequency > 75p Unmatched 0.393 0.431 -0.038 (0.025) -1.51 
 One neighbour 0.391 0.454 -0.063 (0.043) -1.45 
 Two neighbours 0.391 0.485 -0.093 (0.038) -2.47 
 Three neighbours 0.391 0.479 -0.087 (0.036) -2.42 
 Four neighbours 0.391 0.462 -0.071 (0.035) -2.01 
       
Treatment Variable 
(2) Sample 
Treate
d Controls 
Differenc
e s.e. T-stat 
Dissimilarity index > 
p75 Unmatched 0.378 0.428 -0.051 (0.033) -1.53 
 One neighbour 0.378 0.486 -0.108 (0.052) -2.08 
 Two neighbours 0.378 0.454 -0.076 (0.046) -1.67 
 Three neighbours 0.378 0.474 -0.096 (0.043) -2.24 
 Four neighbours 0.378 0.458 -0.080 (0.041) -1.95 
Note: Nearest neighbour matching using propensity score matching, probit estimation of 
propensity score. Propensity score estimation includes standard covariates (see Table 1). 
Number of observations is 2,346. For first treatment variable, three observations are off-
support, for second treatment all observations are on support. Source: GSOEP 1985, IAB 
1985; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9: Heterogeneous effect by year of moving to current place of residence 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 With full 
information 
on year of 
move 
1985 
Move before 
1982 
Move before 
1979 
Move before 
1975 
Move before 
1970 
      
Frequency of own ethnicity -0.036** -0.057*** -0.093*** -0.068** -0.191*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.069) 
Male 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.138*** 0.075 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.068) 
Age at migration -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.017 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) 
Age at migration squ. 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) 
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.030* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) 
Schooling abroad -0.043* -0.042* -0.023 -0.040 0.057 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.044) (0.105) 
Married -0.125*** -0.096*** -0.134*** -0.123** -0.253* 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.041) (0.053) (0.131) 
Children in household 0.012 0.005 -0.019 -0.014 0.034 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.090) 
Constant 0.163* 0.222* 0.534*** 0.637*** 1.327*** 
 (0.098) (0.133) (0.097) (0.153) (0.473) 
Observations 2289 2000 1362 784 222 
R-squared 0.361 0.375 0.391 0.428 0.507 
Note: Dependent variable: Binary variable of speaking ability (Speaking very good or good = 
1, speaking fair, poor or not at all = 0). Regressions control for ethnicity fixed effects and 
fixed effects for 85 regional Anpassungsschichten in West Germany. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: GSOEP 1984-85 and IAB 1975/1985; 
authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10: Multinomial Choice estimates of payoff function ξ , regional pull and push 
factors, and cost of learning German 
 (1) (2) 
  Logit Probit 
Quadratic -19.1728 -7.0629 
 (1.401)  
Linear 27.9283 10.6681 
  (1.3668)   
Unemployment -0.1139 -0.0530 
 (0.0135)  
Population 0.1966 0.1034 
  (0.0168)   
Constant 10.0109 4.6828 
 (0.8761)  
Age at migraton 0.0847 0.0488 
 (0.0576)  
Years since migration -0.0241 -0.0197 
 (0.0781)  
Years of schooling -0.297 -0.1939 
 (0.1341)  
Schooling abroad 0.5863 0.3652 
  (1.8063)   
LL -2061.3 -4781.1 
LL ratio index 0.1206 0.0917 
Note: Estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Sandwich standard errors in parentheses. The first 
two estimates refer to parameters a and b in the payoff function xbxax ∗+∗= 2)(ξ .  
Source: GSOEP 2001; authors’ calculations 
 
Table 11: Counterfactual simulations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Benchmark 
Equal 
distribution 
More 
education 
Higher 
concentration Data 
German speakers (%) 46.7% 48.3% 52.7% 43.0% 46.8% 
 (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3)  
Living in Berlin (%) 7.4% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 5.3% 
 (0.85) (0.86) (0.84) (0.82)  
German speakers in 
Berlin (%) 44.2% 47.4% 49.8% 40.4% 71.4% 
 (5.7) (5.8) (5.8) (5.7)  
Regions with at least 
one immigrant 77.2 76.6 77.2 76.9 88 
 (2.8) (2.8) (2.9) (2.9)  
Note: Means from 500 simulations on a sample of 1,018 immigrants. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. . Source: GSOEP 2001; authors’ calculations. 
 
